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One suspects that the title From Gutenberg to Zuckerberg was the choice of its publisher rather than 
of its author, John Naughton, because the sense it gives of having arrived at a destination is precisely 
the opposite of the book's message. As he describes it, the Internet is very much a work in the early 
days of its progress and in the history of media technology there have been many more beginnings 
than endings. So Mark Zuckerberg is not the culminating point of the last 450 years of cultural 
change, rather a name that makes for a clever bit of wordplay in the title. 
On the other hand Johannes Gutenberg has never had it so good. Ever since Marshall McLuhan 
plucked him from obscurity in the 1960s, he has been the brand name for the last major media 
revolution in the western world, the fifteenth century invention of movable type.  Over time this 
deceptively simple innovation led to the mass availability of affordable books, the rapid spread of 
literacy, the widespread use of languages other than Latin in written texts and the loosening of 
church and state controls over individual minds and lives; this in turn brought about the reformation 
in religion, the rapid development of science and industry, the development of new literary forms 
like the novel, the growth of participatory government and a culture of enquiry and debate, in short 
most of those things that make the modern world different from the fifteenth century. 
If the fifty years before the publication of The Gutenberg Galaxy in 1962 had seen the spread of 
other mass media such as recorded music, cinema, radio and television, these had still not brought 
about a comparable degree of fundamental change—it has only been the rise of the Internet that 
has raised the possibility that we are experiencing another media-led cultural revolution of 
Gutenberg proportions. If we take the impact of culture on human life seriously, and if we 
understand the impact of technology on culture, then this makes it a matter of the first importance. 
Naughton makes the point that those involved in and affected by historical revolutions generally 
have only a hazy perception of events as they unfold, and even less of a grasp on their long-term 
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implications. Although we now have a much greater awareness of the processes and possibilities of 
technologically-driven change than was possible in the fifteenth century, we have not, either 
collectively or individually, had much success at predicting the developments that have unfolded 
over the past twenty years; most attempts to do so have generally been based on extrapolating the 
most recent set of changes out into the indefinite future. By 1473, Naughton points out, eighteen 
years into the Gutenberg era, no one would have suspected that historians of the future would 
come to credit his invention with the Reformation and the rise of science, and we can expect 
similarly unpredictable and substantial change and disruption this time around. This might seem like 
an obvious point—and rather a disappointing one for those wanting a crystal ball approach—but, 
prior to the introduction of the Web in the early 1990s, mass participation in the Internet had not 
been widely foreseen and the dotcom crash of the late 1990s was widely perceived as the passing of 
a geeky fad, compared by some to CB radio. At that time Amazon was operating at a loss and social 
networking was something that happened at conferences and other face-to-face occasions. 
Naughton takes Gutenberg seriously. It is easy to look back at the past and assume that what 
happened could not have happened otherwise, or that it resulted from the operation of abstract 
forces of "progress," in which contingency, luck, coincidence and individual lives played no part, but 
the unique skills that Gutenberg brought to his enterprise—metallurgy, metal casting, ink making 
and press construction (derived from winemaking), not to mention the raising of finance—suggest 
that the development of modern printing in Europe was not an inevitability, at least not at that time 
and in that manner. This is important for our understanding of the development of the Internet. 
The social and political consequences of the print revolution may have taken centuries to emerge, 
but that they did so at all was due to changes brought about in human cognition and the way in 
which people interacted with one another and the world. Where reading had been the preserve of 
the very few, and confined almost entirely to the religious domain and to a very limited number of 
texts, the cheap replication of large numbers of texts created two new entities, the writer and the 
reader. Reading was essentially a private activity, but it transcended space and time and put the 
individual in touch with other minds and thinking. Over time, reading made possible the extended 
development and refinement of ideas, and made a space for a richer and more concentrated 
thought life than was available in an oral society. For the writer it became possible to reach and 
shape an audience, to make contact with those unknown individuals who might be prepared to 
listen, understand and act on their words. (Naughton also credits printing with the rise of 
"individualism," but this is a debatable point. Arguments that people in the past, and those living in 
oral cultures, were and are less fully formed than those living in literate and print-based cultures 
ignore the fact that the evidence is necessarily skewed in favour of those who are able to leave a 
written record.  It could even be argued that people in oral societies, with more highly developed 
memories, more extensive networks of relations and connections and a shared store of anecdote, 
legend and history lead richer interpersonal and “internal” lives than most citizens of modern mass 
societies.) 
Turning to the Internet, Naughton adopts an ecological metaphor to describe the interaction 
between media and human society: "Any change in the environment – in the media which support 
social and cultural life – will have corresponding effects on the organism." Identifying cyberspace as 
"a place all on its own" he recounts its utopian beginnings as a "a space in which corporations and 
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commercial interests were largely absent." In 1996, John Perry Barlow's Declaration of the 
Independence of Cyberspace ringingly declared it to be "an act of nature [that] grows itself through 
our collective actions" quite separate from that other space in which governments and businesses 
operate. " Where there are problems," Barlow declared, "we will ... address them by our means." 
Quite who "we" were was less clear but it probably didn't include the massive commercial interests 
like Amazon or Google who were already joining the early adopters. However, the idealistic and 
anarchic strain of the early Internet is not to be lightly dismissed, and Naughton points to its ongoing 
influence in such areas as wikileaks and the open software movement. 
Alongside this utopianism there has been a equally strong dystopian counterpoint—the sudden mass 
availability of unfiltered information included, as newspapers obsessively pointed out, bomb-making 
recipes, pornography and, as blogging and other self-publishing channels became available, a 
cacophony of opinion, misinformation, disinformation and mindless trivia. What was worse the 
Internet was seen to be interfering with the very way in which our minds work, psychically rewiring 
us into shallow easily-distracted multitaskers and undoing much of Gutenberg's good work. 
Naughton's third chapter, For the Net, Disruption is a Feature Not a Bug, is a brief history of the 
Internet, looking at those events that could have happened otherwise and arguing that continuing 
change is built into the very fabric of the network. The TCP/IP protocol grew out of the US Defense 
Department's ARPAnet project in the 1970s, and was deliberately designed to be both robust and 
flexible by having no centralised control and by not being optimised for any specific application. It 
was simply a system for sending ones and zeroes between points on the network and the system 
itself was agnostic as to what they were, forming the basis of our so-called Net neutrality. It was the 
openness of this architecture that made possible a number of what Naughton calls first and second 
order surprises, things that were possible because, fundamentally, nothing that was possible was 
disallowed. 
The first of the first-order surprises was the World Wide Web, developed by Tim Berners-Lee at the 
CERN laboratory in Geneva in the early 1990s. Naughton gives us a nice account of how a relatively 
simple set of protocols (HTML), designed to allow scientists in different parts of the world to share 
documents, was both powerful and "open" enough to become the main road on the "information 
superhighway.” (Naughton largely ignores the pre-Web Internet culture of the 1980s based around 
online bulletin boards, Usenet groups and FTP, and takes no account of the possibility that another 
protocol such as Gopher, also under development in the early 1990s and with a less permissive 
structure than HTML, could have achieved the critical number of users, the so-called "network 
effect,” that would have made it the main road instead.) Although the work on HTML was carried 
out relatively quickly once the resources were in place, Berners-Lee had been thinking about his 
document-sharing system since the mid 1980s and his various proposals had been greeted with only 
lukewarm enthusiasm by his superiors. In the end it was only the relatively open culture of the non-
profit-driven research lab environment that allowed the project to proceed, and we possibly owe the 
openness of the Web (the "end-to-end principle") to the leanness of this environment. The really 
important point, however, looking back at the history of HTML, is that it might just as easily not have 
happened, or that we might have been left with a number of competing protocols and no 
superhighway at all. Alternatively, had the Web come out of a commercial environment things could 
have been very different—Microsoft Web or iWeb! None of us has ever directly paid for a Web 
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browser, for example, but it would be highly unusual for a knowledge worker in the modern world 
not to have made use of paid-for word processing at some stage—most of us do so on a daily basis. 
iWeb in particular presents an intriguing prospect—an enticing but expensive multimedia digital 
paradise running on any Apple device and open to any developer to create content of which Apple 
Inc approved and from which they took their cut. 
Things that work reasonably well, as the Web does, tend to be taken for granted as part of the 
natural tendency of the world to progress, but in 1999 the second of Naughton's first-order surprises 
was indeed a great deal more surprising: Napster, the peer-to-peer (i.e. computer-to-computer) 
system created by a nineteen-year-old, that allowed digital music files to be shared between any 
two Internet users. At this point the true meaning of Web openness became dramatically apparent; 
Shawn Fanning's system involved a massive breach of copyright, and was shut down within a couple 
of years, but there had been absolutely no technical barrier to its creation and dissemination. What 
was worse for the stunned and disrupted recording industry, by the time Napster disappeared the 
mp3 cat was well and truly out of the bag and peer-to-peer filesharing had become normalised and 
ineradicable. 
The third first-order surprise was even more alarming and sinister in a way that Napster, which can 
be seen as an act of genuine, albeit illegal, generosity, was not. From the mid-1990s on, the sudden 
upsurge of connection to the Internet of millions of PCs, many operated by naïve users, created an 
ideal environment for the growth and spread of the malware, spyware, bots, botnets and spam that 
we still endure on an everyday basis. This is the downside of Internet openness; for example, the 
protocol under which email operates (SMTP) does not have a provision forcing senders to 
authenticate themselves, and therefore enables the low-risk and low-cost sending of massive 
amounts of spam that has in turn significantly compromised the effectiveness of email (the first 
Internet application many of us used) as an everyday tool. Contrary to Barlow's declaration of 
independence, the "we" of cyberspace was really just the same old "us"—criminals, vandals, 
advertisers and just plain nuisances included—that we had been all along. 
Naughton's second-order surprises, "innovations that built on the openness of the first-order 
surprises," are Wikipedia and Facebook, both examples of Web 2.0 or the participative Internet. As 
originally conceived of by Berners-Lee, the Web was essentially a read-only environment, a means of 
creating access to finished documents and other digital objects, but the needs of ecommerce had led 
to mechanisms through which users could interact with websites. By allowing users to talk back to it, 
the Web had gone from being a broadcast medium to a social one, and Web users now had the 
ability to become participants without going to the trouble of creating a website. There is not space 
here to discuss the pros and cons of Wikipedia as an academic information source, but its continued 
existence and the fact that it has become indispensable to many or most of us as an everyday fact-
checker probably speaks for itself. Naughton quotes James Boyle on the subject of "cultural 
agoraphobia," that "we are very good at seeing the downsides and the dangers of open systems" 
[i.e. Wikipedia] but that "it's easier for us to understand the benefits of closed systems [i.e. 
Encyclopedia Britannica] and harder for us to see the downsides." Similarly with Facebook, the 
power of the Network Effect has made it, at least by my observation, the preferred social space for a 
generation of students, often displacing the formal (closed system) shared spaces provided by their 
own institutions as they create their own course-based (open system) Facebook groups away from 
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the prying eyes of lecturers. It could be argued that blogging and Twitter are better examples of truly 
participative Web 2.0 applications, but Facebook probably earns its place purely in terms of 
penetration. There may be millions of blogs and bloggers, for example, but most people don't blog, 
whereas "everybody" (at least among active Web users) either "does" Facebook or has made a 
conscious decision not to. Wikipedia is similarly ubiquitous, appearing high in the lists of Google 
results and requiring a deliberate avoidance by those who choose not to use it. The network effect is 
a powerful force. 
A persistent concern about the Web 2.0 is that it is "killing off" established media and professions, 
such as newspapers and journalism, and replacing them with the well-meaning, but lower value, 
work of amateurs in the form of bloggers. (Dan Rather called them "guys in pyjamas".) Naughton 
adopts an ecological approach, likening the newcomers to introduced species that inevitably change 
the environment they enter, but that eventually find their niche without necessarily displacing the 
previous inhabitants. Printing had already done this, lessening but not destroying the influence of 
the individual preacher in religion by making a variety of sermons available to believers, and in more 
recent times television had modified, but not displaced, newspapers, radios and cinema. Bloggers, 
he argues, have entered into a symbiotic relationship with journalists, able to keep stories going long 
after they would have disappeared from front pages or news bulletins, while the professional media 
provide wider exposure, larger financial resources and more solid credentials. The relationship 
between the Guardian newspaper and Wikileaks is an example of this; although it eventually 
dissolved into distrust on both sides (in itself a telling point and one that does not necessarily 
contradict Naughton's ecological thesis), this was only after the Guardian had allowed Julian Assange 
a greater visibility, credibility and freedom from interference ("freedom of the press" is still more 
secure for established media), while the Guardian in turn gained exclusive access to a mass of 
material from which high profile stories could be mined. The relationship between established 
media and bloggers is never an easy one, but this can work in our favour as consumers—obvious 
media mistakes are seized upon with glee by the blogosphere while professional journalism, or at 
least those sections of it that take professionalism seriously, continues for the time being as a 
reservoir of journalistic traditions, training and standards. 
In the 1960s investigative journalism was a successful response to the threat posed by television 
news, but the Internet represents a more direct threat to the news media through its direct 
siphoning off of advertising revenues and there is as yet no obvious answer to this concern. In the 
final analysis, Naughton sees the traditional media as following a "lean-back" one-to-many broadcast 
model, while the way of the future is the "lean-forward" participative model. He is excited by the 
possibilities of what he terms Creativity 2.0 and Productivity 2.0, in particular the mass of do-it-
yourself content that has flooded onto YouTube, such as the parodies of the Hitler movie Downfall 
that have the Führer complaining about, for example, Xbox 2 or the Wellywood sign. This is all very 
well, but somehow Naughton seems to be straining to find a killer example of user-generated 
creativity here. Some of the Downfall clips are indeed very funny but they depend for their effect on 
the original film, not only on its production values but on the fact that it is a serious and well-known 
mainstream work. His other example is Charlie Bit My Finger, truly a YouTube highlight but really a 
lucky accident and less than a minute in length. He is on firmer ground talking about the importance 
of remix culture, the disaggregation and recombination of both blogs and newspapers through rss 
feeds and, increasingly, through Twitter and Facebook. The future, he argues, will favour smaller 
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units, songs rather than albums, headlines and paragraphs rather than newspapers, extracts rather 
than books—an increasing granularisation and personalisation of the content we chose to consume. 
There are precedents for this of course in the "commonplace books" of early modern Europe (the 
original personal mashups) but sampling and remixing are now happening on an unprecedented 
scale. Writing of "the lumbering dinosaurs that dominated the old media ecosystem," he observes 
that "small wonder that they feel depressed." 
If part of our reaction to all of this is simply to long for past simplicities, then there is no good news. 
Complexity is an inbuilt feature of our new reality and is not going to go away. In an interconnected 
world, the individual person or enterprise has less ability to foresee events and make plans, and a 
great deal of activity takes place outside of formally organised structures such as marketplaces or 
educational institutions. Where new structures, such as TradeMe or eBay, have come into being 
they have created their own sets of rules along with new sets or possibilities and risks. This breaking 
of barriers has extended even to the computer itself, with desktop and laptop computers no longer 
operating as standalone digital domains but giving way instead to the new realities of cloud and 
mobile computing. The Internet itself, Naughton points out, has become our computer, and with this 
there is a necessary trade-off in terms of both privacy and autonomy. Meanwhile the Web continues 
to evolve in terms of both functionality and complexity, with rss feeds allowing us to personalise our 
web interactions and APIs (Application Programming Interfaces) giving web designers the tools to 
create mashups from disparate pieces of web content, such as the use of Google maps on local body 
or commercial websites. According to Tim Berners-Lee the next step is the Semantic Web, where 
artificial intelligence will allow search engines to interpret the meanings of words on web pages 
rather than simply carrying out crude (but effective) character-matching operations as they do at 
present. 
Space does not permit a detailed examination of the arguments around copyright here, but they are 
obviously fundamental to many of the issues around the Internet as a channel for the trade and 
exchange of cultural objects in digital formats.  Naughton makes the point that when the various 
copying technologies, firstly analogue systems (which created imperfect copies and carried no inbuilt 
transmission mechanisms) and then digital ones (which created perfect copies with no technical 
barriers to transmission thanks to the open architecture of the Internet) came into use in the second 
half of the twentieth century, they did so in a period when popular culture was heavily 
professionalised, in fact industrialised, and the resulting clash of interests has been particularly 
strong. Copyright is broken, open to profit-gouging (academic publishing) or heavy-handed legal 
abuse (see the case Kookaburra Sits in the Old Gum Tree v Men at Work) on the one hand while 
being largely ignored on the other, with the result that the law is held in contempt. Digital rights 
management has been the industry's response and, in my view, has some chance of success if a light 
and customer-friendly regime is put in place. The recently introduced Spotify could be part of the 
answer – it is based on a low-cost pay-for-service model with content “borrowed” from the Cloud 
rather than owned and locally-stored. Not all content owners are happy with this model however 
and it is likely that copyright will be the site of ongoing culture wars as a read-only industry strives to 
survive in a read-write environment. 
The book concludes with an extended examination of two dystopian novels. George Orwell's 1984 
offers a scary vision of a future in which life and thought are under tight control by central 
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government and in some respects foreshadows the surveillance society we are beginning to take for 
granted (and which the Internet hugely facilitates) while Aldous Huxley's Brave New World 
represents instead a society in which the individual is trivialised and controlled by pleasure and 
entertainment. Naughton posits that we may have already progressed beyond the original open 
digital citizenship of the early Internet into a space largely controlled by the new corporate giants of 
the Internet industry, such as Google and Facebook, who both spy on us (with our "consent" usually 
conferred by mindlessly clicking on the I Agree button without reading what we've just signed up 
for) and delight us, while all the while selling information about us to their advertisers. In the short 
term this may not seem to matter very much—I never really notice ads for example—but what it 
means for the Internet is that it is being shaped with the interests of those companies and their 
clients in mind, rather than those of the digital citizenry at large. Naughton quotes Tim Wu, whose 
book The Master Switch has described a cycle of innovation and openness in communications 
technologies followed by a narrowing of control and eventual monopoly. There is an upside to this of 
course, as anyone who has used iTunes with iPod and/or iPad will tell you, but it brings us into a 
quite different sort of utopia than that envisaged by John Perry Barlow. 
If From Gutenberg to Zuckerberg reached a somewhat depressing conclusion, Nicholas Carr's The 
Shallows: How the Internet is Changing the Way We Think, Read and Remember could be enough to 
put you off going online entirely. I must admit coming to it with a degree of scepticism —alarmist 
titles and subtitles beginning with "How The ..." are not particularly to my taste—but found myself 
frequently nodding at what I was reading with a degree of rueful recognition. The book is a fully-
developed treatment of the argument he made in his 2008 essay in Atlantic Magazine "Is Google 
Making Us Stupid?" which was that extended use of the Internet had changed the way in which we 
read and in which our minds deal with text. In comparison with the deep and extended reading of 
books, when we read on the Internet "our ability to interpret text, to make the rich mental 
connections that form when we read deeply and without distraction, remains largely disengaged." 
Drawing on the research of development psychologist Maryanne Wolf, he argues that the debate 
about content on the Internet (dumbing down or digital nirvana) overshadowed the more 
fundamental question of its effects on the way in which we engage with, understand, store and 
recall information. Once again, the key figure had been Marshall McLuhan who had recognised, in 
his memorable phrase, that "the medium is the message," that our brains are shaped by the tools 
they make use of and that someone living in a largely sound-based information environment thinks 
in a different way from those who primarily absorb information through print. In a print-based 
world, for example, we make less use of memory for things that we are able to write down, but have 
a highly-developed word recognition facility, a larger vocabulary (being sourced more widely than 
simply from people with whom we directly interact) and the ability to follow, and to create, lines of 
thought connecting widely separated ideas, observations or domains. It is this last facility, 
concentrated deep reading and extended thinking, that resulted from a "virtuous cycle," whereby 
growing literacy had created a demand for more writing which eventually led to the sorts of lives 
that were situated largely within the print domain. Carr quotes the words of Wallace Stevens to 
describe this synergy—"The reader became the book." 
It's a pretty fair point that the hyperlinked Web document and the modern multi-windowed 
computer are designed to distract us away from this sort of single-object deep concentration. As we 
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read and write, if we do so in a digital environment, we also check email, follow links from the text 
to the dictionary or Wikipedia which may lead us to other links, receive interruptions from Facebook 
friends commenting on our latest status, and, if we are not careful, end up watching the proverbial 
snake swallowing an egg on YouTube. 
To me Carr is at his best describing his own personal experience, and although the scientific 
evidence he uses to back up his claims is impressive I'm not sure that we needed quite so much of it 
in order to get the point. That the Web and our other electronic media are distracting is pretty well-
understood and the need to carry out extended mental work often requires us to retreat into a quiet 
zone. Whether we are undergoing a fundamental psychological change is less clear, and it could be 
argued that despite all the distraction and noise the Internet has still tended to reinforce the 
importance of text among our media resources. Carr also tends to paint all change as bad, which in 
the end has the effect of diminishing his argument. While it is true that reading a book on an e-
reader is different from reading it in print, it is not so markedly different as to obviate any 
advantages we might find in the digital format. (Shakespeare did not write in order to be read, for 
example, but his work has survived the format-shifting remarkably well and we can be grateful for 
being able to look his words up in a book whenever we wish to.) Rather more interesting is his attack 
on artificial intelligence and by implication, although he does not name it, the semantic web. One of 
the more inflated claims made by Google has been that eventually their search engine wouldn't just 
find information for us, but would be, in Larry Page's words, "as smart as people—or smarter." In 
fact, Carr argues, AI research has come to something of a dead-end, unable to reduce the workings 
of our minds to a set of algorithms that would be able to interpret the difference between "time flies 
like an arrow" and "fruit flies like a banana." 
Both Naughton and Carr look back approvingly to the scholar and critic Neil Postman, whom 
Naughton in fact describes as "the most compelling media commentator of my lifetime." Postman's 
Amusing Ourselves to Death: Public Discourse in the Age of Show Business is a sustained and 
sobering attack on television and its role in dumbing us down and reducing the level of public debate 
to set positions and soundbites. As with Carr, there is much to recognise and approve of here, but by 
the end of the book the overall impression is that Postman hasn't liked any new media since 
Gutenberg and that, in his view, the world has been going to the dogs for the past two hundred 
years. In fact he explicitly argues that "in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, American public 
discourse, being rooted in the bias of the printed word, was serious, inclined toward rational 
argument, and, therefore, made up of meaningful content." 
So when, we might ask, did things start going wrong, when did we begin to turn from serious to 
show biz? Postman can put a date on this; it was the invention of the telegraph in 1837 that 
"destroyed the prevailing definition of information and ... gave a new meaning to public discourse." 
By breaking the bounds of local community, where all news was immediately relevant and useful, 
the telegraph, and later the telephone, cinema, radio and television, had made available a diet of 
sensation and trivia to displace the serious and rational discourse of his beloved eighteenth century. 
In support of this argument he quotes Henry David Thoreau, complaining of the prospect of a trans-
Atlantic telegraph that "perchance the first news that will leak through into the broad flapping 
American ear will be that Princess Adelaide [daughter of Queen Victoria] has the whooping cough." I 
have a problem with this oft-repeated quote, which is that it precedes the American experience of 
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the telegraph, and predicts rather than describes its effect—in other words, it is proof that the 
tendency towards triviality was well and truly present before the era of electronic communications. 
More generally, Postman's veneration of the "rational" eighteenth century makes him guilty of the 
golden age fallacy, a variation of the progressive fallacy which places the ideal human society not in 
the future but in the recent past. 
By way of contrast, Clay Shirky takes a thoroughly optimistic view of the networked era while being 
crisply dismissive of the claims of deep extended reading; he has said of War and Peace that "it's too 
long, and not so interesting." This may sound somewhat glib, but his book Cognitive Surplus: 
Creativity and Generosity in a Connected Age displays a good deal of sense, learning and extended 
thought alongside its sometimes breathless positivity. In particular Shirky does something that the 
three other authors under consideration do not; where they see society very much as being shaped 
and determined by its media choices, he asks a more basic question, which is about the factors that 
determine the media choices we individually and collectively make. Like Postman, he identifies 
television as the dominant medium of the late twentieth century, but rather than placing the blame 
for its shallowness entirely on the medium he looks instead at its social meaning, likening it to the 
epidemic of gin drinking in eighteenth century London, which led at the time to a similar degree of 
moral panic ("mother's ruin") and calls for regulation. The root cause of the gin problem was not gin 
itself, which had been around for some time, but the social disruption caused by industrialisation 
and urbanisation. He does not deny that excessive gin consumption had serious consequences in 
itself, and that it needed to be controlled, but suggests that the gin culture was a necessary stage of 
adjustment to a new social reality, and that it declined once sufficient social supports were in place 
for the urban population to exist more comfortably. 
According to Shirky the social change underlying the television (and, by extension, the Internet) 
epidemic was the sudden availability of unstructured free time in people's lives from the 1940s on. 
Where work, both outside the home and domestic, and child rearing, had taken most of people's 
time, there was now a surplus of available hours in the day. Smaller families and geographic 
separation from extended family and friends compounded this unlikely "problem" and the result was 
an epidemic of television watching which was, like gin, cheap, highly available and pleasantly 
anaesthetising, even if it did not, in the long run, lead to greater individual happiness. As an antidote 
to loneliness the box provided not only a family activity (reading tends to be a solitary pleasure) but 
also an endless supply of ready-made but fictional friends and companions. 
Shirky is, then, no fan of television but he does, I think, correctly identify time availability, loneliness 
and social disconnection (despite "busy" modern lives we watch on average twenty hours of 
television a week) as the major factors underlying the heavy use and misuse of modern media. 
Turning to the Internet, he finds rich support for his argument in the rapid growth of Web 2.0, and 
this is where the "cognitive surplus" comes into play. In the professional realm, the development of 
open source software like the Apache webserver has been a notable cooperative achievement, but 
Shirky's true interest lies with the cooperative power of ordinary people. Taking issue with nay-
sayers like Andrew Keen (who in The Cult of the Amateur likened bloggers to monkeys) Shirky points 
to Wikipedia as one example among many of the power of the Internet to harness and organise 
disparate and geographically separated groups into powerfully functional units, comparing this 
effect to the "invisible college" of scientifically-minded individuals who came together around the 
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chemist Robert Boyle in the mid-seventeenth century and went on to form the Royal Society. Social 
networking has made it easy to coordinate otherwise isolated individuals into ad hoc teams for 
highly specific purposes, with a speed and efficiency that could hardly have been imagined even ten 
years ago—the Student Volunteer Army that came together after the first Canterbury earthquake of 
2010 and then used Facebook for a second and much more dramatic deployment in February 2011 is 
a striking local example. 
For Shirky any positive engagement with social media is preferable to the passivity of being a mere 
consumer, and every posting of a lolcat to ICanHasCheezburgers is a piece of cultural production. 
Naturally this brings to light a great deal that is banal, repetitive, trivial or nasty (check out the 
comments made about operatic sopranos on YouTube) but this is only to be expected from mass 
participation and may be simply a stage we have to go through on the way to achieving greater 
collective maturity. As he points out, mass participation in any endeavour will bring down the 
average performance but will not affect the top end, so we still have plenty of items of high cultural 
value. At its best mass participative behaviour can lead to powerful social action. Shirky gives the 
example of the Association of Pub-going, Loose and Forward Women in the Indian city of Mangalore, 
formed to combat controls on women's social freedoms, but sometimes this type of activity can 
begin spontaneously within groups formed for different purposes. In the United Kingdom Mumsnet 
was originally founded as a source of advice on parenting issues but has broadened out to become a 
powerful and influential forum on domestic violence and rape, to the point that these are now 
characterised as "mumsnet issues." 
It would, I think, be wrong to characterise Shirkey as a wholly uncritical cheerleader for the Internet 
as a social and political force for good, but he does position himself very much at that end of the 
spectrum. A useful counterpoint to Cognitive Surplus is Evgeny Morozov's The Net Delusion: The 
Dark Side of Internet Freedom.  Morozov is a startlingly young Belarussian with an exceptionally 
mature grasp on the geopolitical and social realities of life in authoritarian countries, and he takes 
particular issue with the notion that it was the battle of ideas and the influence of western media 
that brought an end to communism in eastern Europe and its replacement with democracy, and with 
its neoconservative corollary that the same thing is about to happen with the Internet.  Far from 
being bumbling print-age technophobes, modern authoritarians are technically savvy, whether it 
comes to flooding the Web with cheap and diverting entertainments, using lists of  Facebook friends 
to compile an inventory of political suspects, or corralling the efforts of nationalist bloggers and 
commenters in support of their own political agendas.  Using examples from a variety of contexts, 
Morozov skewers the widely held belief that the Internet has inherent qualities that favour the 
western democratic consensus,  and points out that the repetition of this position by American 
government officials makes it easy for the Chinese government to paint demands for Internet 
freedom as simply another form of political interference. All governments face demands to curb 
absolute Internet freedom, and one doesn't have to give in entirely to moral and political relativism 
to recognise that one country's freedom fighter is another's terrorist. On top of this, the same tools 
that can coordinate political demonstrations can also be used to facilitate widespread harassment of 
minorities and even genocide.  We are already a long way from saving the world one Facebook 
petition at a time. 
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As a profession, librarians have engaged with the Internet longer, more intensively and perhaps 
more creatively than most and this may create an illusion that we are successfully riding the tiger. 
The idea of change itself has perhaps become such a cliche that we no longer take it seriously, but 
this would also be a mistake. Looking at these five books I can recognise within myself and my 
colleagues important elements from each of these authors. Neil Postman's passionate commitment 
to enlightenment values and the primacy of the book still underlies much of what we feel, even as 
we recognise that the world moves forward and that we need to curb our nostalgic anger. Nicholas 
Carr provides a powerful reminder that the voices of distraction need to be resisted and that, in the 
end, computers and networks are machines and tools and we are people and we do well to keep the 
two categories at arm's length. Clay Shirky on the other hand knows that the world is always, and 
never, going to hell in a handbasket and that we need to look for the positive human values in even 
those things that we are most tempted to deplore and to always seek to explain as well as to 
condemn. Evgeny Morozov, however, is a timely minder that Net neutrality includes political and 
moral neutrality and that powerful tools lose none of their power in the wrong hands. If you have 
time to read only one book, though, it should probably be John Naughton's comprehensive account 
of where we are, how we got here and why we don't really have a clue where we are going. 
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